Abstract-With the growing popularity of sensor-based monitoring devices, sensor networks are becoming an essential part of wireless heterogeneous networks and numerous researches have been widely studied in recent years. Recently, Das et al. proposed a dynamic password-based user authentication scheme with dynamic node addition for hierarchical wireless sensor networks (WSNs). They claimed that their scheme achieves better security as compared to those for other existing password-based user authentication approaches. However, we observe that Das et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to smart card breach attack, privileged-insider attack, and many logged-in users' attack and is not easily reparable.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a hierarchical wireless sensor network (HWSN), there are three kinds of participants, namely: base station (BS), cluster heads (CH) and sensor nodes. In general, normal sensor nodes are deployed randomly in their corresponding cluster heads and a cluster head is more resource rich than normal sensor nodes. Moreover, cluster heads are responsible for collecting sense data from their cluster sensors and relaying sense data to a powerful data processing/storage center BS. When a user wants to access real-time data from a target CH, they resort to the base station for authenticating each other [1] , [2] .
In the rapid development of HWSN environment, many security issues such as user"s privacy, data integrity, access control and communication protection are brought into attention [3] - [7] . In order to protect network security, user authentication has gradually become an important part of electronic communications, including various distributed systems, mobile computing, network applications and computer resources [8] - [12] . The concept of user authentication is to prevent damages by malicious attacks on the computer networks. In 2009, Das proposed a two-factor Manuscript received November 25, 2012; revised March 7, 2013 II. REVIEW OF DAS ET AL."S SCHEME user authentication scheme [13] based on passwords and smart cards for hierarchical wireless sensor networks. However, in 2010, Khan and Alghathbar [14] showed that Das's scheme is insecure against BS-node bypassing attacks and privileged-insider attacks. Later, Das's scheme has attracted a lot of attention and many two-factor user authentication and key agreement schemes have been proposed in He et al. (2010) [15] , [16] , Yeh et al. (2011) [17] , and Das et al. (2012) [18] .
Very recently, Das et al. proposed a dynamic password-based user authentication scheme with smart cards for hierarchical wireless sensor networks [18] . Their scheme has several advantages such as provision of mutual authentication, provision of session key between user and sensor node/cluster head, provision of dynamic node addition and provision of user friendly. In addition, in their paper, they claimed that their scheme is suitable for some practical scenarios and secure against various known attacks such as replay attack, many logged-in users with the same login-id attack, stolen-verifier attack, off-line password guessing attack, password change attack, node capture attack, smart card breach attack, denial-of-service attack, privileged-insider attack and masquerade attack. However, we find that their scheme still cannot resist against smart card breach attack and a malicious attacker can mount undetectable off-line password guessing attacks and impersonation attacks. Moreover, in Section III, we show how a privileged-insider can lunch a compromised cluster head attack so that the compromised cluster head can derive system secret key and how a legitimate user can and lunch a many logged-in users' attack so that the simultaneous access of a legitimate user's account in the system by multiple non-registered users and the base station is not aware of having caused flaw.
scheme. Four roles participate in this scheme: the base station (BS), the sensor node (Sj ), the cluster head in the j-th cluster (CHj ), and the User (Ui). Before deployment of the sensor nodes and cluster heads in a target field, BS assigns a unique identifier IDCHj to each cluster head CHj and a unique identifier IDSi to each regular sensor node Si. Moreover, BS randomly chooses a unique master key MKCHj for each cluster head CHj and a unique master key MKSi for each regular sensor node Si. Finally, BS loads (IDCHj ,MKCHj ) into the memory of each cluster head CHj and (IDSi ,MKSi) into the memory of each regular sensor node Si. The scheme is divided into four phases: registration phase, login phase, authentication phase, and password change phase. The flowchart of Das et al.'s scheme is depicted in Fig. 1 .
A. Registration Phase
Ui selects IDi and PWi, computes RPWi = h(y||PWi) and sends RPWi and IDi to BS, where y is a random number only known to Ui. Then,
where Xs is only known to BS and XA is shared between Ui and BS. Moreover, BS selects m+m' deployed cluster heads with m+m' key-plus-id combinations {(Kj, IDCHj)|1 < j < m+m'}, where Kj = EMKCHm+j (IDi||IDCHm+j ||Xs). Finally, BS stores IDi, y, XA, ri, ei, h(.), and m+m' key-plus-id combinations {(Kj, IDCHj)|1 < j < m+m' } into a tamper-proof smart card.
B. Login Phase
In this phase, Ui inserts smart card into specific reader and enters PWi. Then smart card computes RPWi' = h(y||PWi), x' = h(RPWi'||XA) and ri' = h(y||x') and verifies ri' = ri. If it is valid, the smart card computes Ni = h(x'||T1), where T1 is current timestamp of Ui. Finally, smart card computes a ciphertext message EKj(IDi||IDCHj||Ni ||ei||T1) and sends the login request message〈IDi||IDCHj||EKj(IDi||IDCHj||Ni ||ei||T1)〉 to BS via a public channel. 
C. Authentication Phase

D. Password Change Phase
. Finally, the smart card replaces ri and ei with ri' and ei', respectively.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF DAS ET AL.'S SCHEME
Although Das et al. claimed that their scheme can resist many types of attacks and satisfy all the essential requirements for hierarchical wireless sensor networks. However, the actual situation is not the case and the cryptanalysis of Das et al.'s user authentication scheme has been made in this section. We use the notations in this paper to describe our proposed cryptanalysis in Table I and the detailed cryptanalysis is presented as follows. 
A. Smart Card Breach Attack
In this attack, we assume that Ui's smart card is stolen by an attacker Ua and the secret parameters {IDi, y,XA, ri, ei, h(.), (Kj , IDCHj )} which are stored in the smart card can be extracted by monitoring its power consumption [19] .
Off-line password guessing attack: As we know, the secret parameters of the smart card are {IDi, y,XA, ri = h(y||x), 
B. Compromised Cluster Head Attack
Consider that a malicious cluster head CHj may try to derive system secret Xs to damage the security of entire wireless sensor networks. We assume that a legal user Ui's smart card is stolen by CHj and the m key-plus-id combinations {(Kj, IDCHj)| 1  j  m} which are stored in the smart card can be extracted by monitoring its power consumption [19] , where Kj = EMKCHj (IDi||IDCHj ||Xs). Using CHj 's master key MKCHj , CHj decrypts Kj and thus, DMKCHj (EMKCHj(IDi||IDCHj||Xs)) = (IDi||IDCHj||Xs). Finally, the system secret key Xs is successfully derived by the malicious cluster head CHj and Das et al.'s scheme cannot resist compromised cluster head attack.
C. Many Logged-in Users' Attack
In Das et al.'s scheme, the simultaneous access of a legitimate user's account in the base station by multiple non-registered users using the same identity and password of the user and the base station is not aware of having caused flaw. We assume that a registered and legal user's smart card is massively duplicated and Ui's PWi is intentionally exposed to N attackers Uax, where x = 1, 2, …, N. Then all who has smart card and knows PWi can login to the base station BS at the same time by performing the following steps:
Step 1: Each Uax selects a cluster head IDCHj and its corresponding master key Kj from (Kj , IDCHj) and computes
where Tax is the current timestamp of Uax.
Step 2: Each Uax makes a valid login message to impersonate Ui by sending 〈 IDi||IDCHj ||EKj (IDi||IDCHj||N * ix ||ei||Tax)〉to the base station BS via a public channel.
Step 3: Upon receiving all the login request messages
, …, UaN, BS gets the same identity IDi and password PWi with different cluster heads. Finally, BS allows all of Ua1, Ua2, …, UaN to login and access Ui"s account simultaneously.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed that Das et al.'s dynamic password-based user authentication scheme for hierarchical WSNs is insecure. By adopting power analysis attacks, we found their protocol may suffer from off-line password guessing attacks, impersonation attacks, compromised cluster head attacks and any attacker who possesses the legitimate user's smart card can easily launch a many logged-in users' attack. In future work, we plan to propose an improvement on their scheme and we also encourage readers can propose their improvement to remedy security flaws of Das et al.'s scheme. 
